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BOOK REVIEW
"Only Fools and Dead People Never Change
Their Opinions"*
TRIAL AND ERROR: THE AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER CREATION
AND EVOLUTION. EDWARD J. LARSON, Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1985. Pp. 222. $21.95.
VITO J. TITONE**
I. INTRODUCTION
For many, the persistence and tenacity of the creationist movement
seems a curious and perhaps even bizarre development in our highly sec-
ular western culture. This was true in 1925 when the creationist move-
ment reached a crescendo and the famous Scopes v. State I trial captured
the attention of the nation. It is equally true of the past two decades,
which have seen a remarkable resurgence of the drive to inject biblical
views of mankind's origins into the public schools. Edward J. Larson,2 a
practicing attorney, has written a lucid and thought-provoking account
of the sixty-year battle between creationists and Darwinists. His thor-
oughly researched book, Trial and Error: The American Controversy Over
Creation and Evolution, traces the various legislative and judicial
skirmishes for control of the public schools' science curricula.
The book provides valuable information about the shifting strategies
of the combatants and the motives that drove them. Mr. Larson has mar-
shaled a wealth of details and facts, but his book is ultimately unsatisfy-
* E. ANDREWS, A PRACTICAL CouRsE IN BOTANY 362 (1911).
** The Honorable Vito J. Titone is an Associate Judge of the New York State Court of
Appeals.
1. 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927) (For an account of the case itself and its courtroom
legacy on creationism and evolution, see L. DE CAMP, THE GREAT MONKEY TRIAL (1968); R.
GINGER, Six DAYS OR FOREVER? TENNESSEE V. JOHN THOMAS SCOPES (1958); M. SETTLE, THE
SCOPES TRIAL: THE STATE OF TENNESSEE V. JOHN THOMAS SCOPES (1972)).
2. In addition to holding a B.A. degree from Williams College and a law degree from Harvard
University, Mr. Larson earned a Ph.D. in the history of science from the University of Wisconsin.
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ing because it provides little insight into the social forces that have fueled
the fervor that continues to surround this controversy. Moreover,
although Trial and Error touches upon the legal problems that arise
when the principles of the establishment clause, freedom of expression,
and freedom of worship clash, it does not adequately explore those
problems or offer substantive ideas that would aid in resolving them.
Thus, while Larson has given us a scholarly review of the relevant facts
and events, plausible answers to the many questions his work poses will
have to await the work of future scholars.
II. THE CREATIONIST MOVEMENT'S ROOTS
Few of the scientists who were present when the modem theory of
evolution was first publicly introduced on July 1, 1858 could have envi-
sioned the sweeping revolution in scientific and social thought that it
would eventually produce? Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection
transformed the science of biology from a simple systematic effort to
classify the species, to a sophisticated study of the cause-and-effect rela-
tionships that exist in nature.4 The theory also served as a model for the
ideas of Social Darwinists, who used the concept of the survival of the
fittest to justify some of the harsher aspects of modem industrial life,
such as poverty, imperialism, and racial oppression.5 Finally, Darwin's
theory of evolution represented a direct challenge to the biblical view of
mankind's origins and touched off a controversy that was to continue
into the present day.
Due largely to advances in the technology of the printing press, Dar-
win's ideas spread rapidly throughout the scientific community.6 Within
thirty years of the publication of Origin of the Species, evolutionary con-
cepts had made their way into scholastic textbooks. The earliest textbook
treatments of the subject were efforts to reconcile Darwin's theory of
3. On that date, thirty members of the Linnean Society, a select group of naturalists, heard a
brief presentation of the papers of Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace, who had been simultane-
ously developing the theory that no two individual plants are alike and that the process of natural
selection determines which characteristics of each plant specie will continue into future generations.
Although Darwin's seminal book, ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES, was not published until 1859, most
historians regard the presentation before the Linnean Society as the beginning of modem evolution-
ary thought. D. BoolesnN, THE DISCOVERERS 465 (1983).
4. Id. at 420-64.
5. Social Darwinism may have been the natural intellectual successor to Calvinism, which saw
differences in wealth and power as reflections of the choices in bestowing divine grace that had been
made by the supreme being.
6. BOoRsnN, supra note 3, at 465.
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evolution with that of divine creation.' By the turn of the century, how-
ever, the scientific theory of evolution had completely supplanted the bib-
lical view of creation, and Darwinian thought was presented in
increasingly dogmatic tones.
Nonetheless, an adverse public reaction to this direct assault on pop-
ular religious beliefs did not manifest itself until the early 1920s. Larson
attributes the relatively sudden emergence of public concern to the ex-
pansion of secondary education in the 1920s and the concomitant in-
crease in the public's interest in the high school curriculum (pp. 24-27).
Whatever its immediate cause, the campaign to outlaw evolutionary
teaching in the public schools did not begin in earnest until the period
between 1920 and 1925.
As Larson's book makes clear, the anti-evolution movement of that
period was the product of a variety of social forces (pp. 40-41). The wide-
spread disillusionment that followed World War I coincided with the
public concern over a perceived deterioration in the moral fabric of the
nation. Disappointment with the results of the preceding generation's lib-
eral experiments in social engineering induced public disenchantment
with modernity. On the positive side were the progressive impulses of
reformers concerned about such diverse evils as industrialization, urban-
ization, intemperance, and child labor. The perceived moral collapse and
societal insecurity that characterized the postwar era led many to yearn
for simpler times and simpler answers to seemingly unanswerable ques-
tions. Given the tenor of those tumultuous years, it was inevitable that
many would turn to the comfort and certainty of old-time religion. When
these revived Fundamentalist attitudes were combined with the contem-
porary progressives' instincts to use the machinery of government to ef-
fect social change, it was also inevitable that the attentions of those who
were most concerned would focus on political solutions to the moral and
social issues of the era.8
7. Pre-Darwinian textbooks took for granted the divine origins of life. As Larson points out, one
of the most important textbook authors of the nineteenth century, Asa Gray, posited in the original
version of his book that "the Creator established a definite number of species at the beginning, which
have continued by propagation, each after its kind" (pp. 9-10) (quoting A. GRAY, FIRST LESSONS IN
BOTANY AND VEGETABLE PHYSIOLOGY 175 (1857)). Subtle alterations in the role of the Creator,
however, began to appear in later editions. While God remained the primary cause of all life and
order in the universe, the mechanism of evolution through natural selection was recognized as the
secondary cause and the immediate explanation for nature's variety (p. 10).
8. For a thorough discussion of the social forces that produced the Fundamentalist revival of
the 1920s, see W. GATEWOOD, PREACHERS, PEDAGOGUES AND POLITICIANS: THE EVOLUTION
CONTROVERSY IN NORTH CAROLINA 1920-1927 (1966). Perhaps future generations of historians
will identify similar social factors as causes of the current resurgence of Fundamentalism. Our con-
1987]
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The Fundamentalist movement of the 1920s, which was fostered by
such historically significant communications media as church meetings,
Chautauqua conferences, and widely-distributed printed tracts, did not
initially focus on evolutionary teaching as its main target. Rather, the
earliest Fundamentalist preachers focused on vague concepts of modern-
ism and infidelity to the teachings of the Bible as the primary sources of
social evil. The turning point appears to have occurred in 1921, when
William Jennings Bryan, one of the greatest orators and reformers of the
period, called attention to Darwinian theory as a root cause of social
depravity.
In what is perhaps his most significant contribution to our under-
standing of the anti-evolution phenomenon, Larson provides numerous
excerpts from Bryan's speeches and writings that portray his motives as a
peculiar admixture of reformist impulse and reactionary sentiment (pp.
45-47). To be sure, the focus of Bryan's speeches was the threat to Chris-
tian orthodoxy that Darwinism posed. Bryan's hostility to science was
expressed in such beautifully cadenced prose as his famous observation
that "it is better to trust in the Rock of Ages, than to know the age of the
rocks; it is better for one to know that he is close to the Heavenly Father,
than to know how far the stars in the heavens are apart" (p. 47). But the
Great Commoner, who with his famous "Cross of Gold" speech had
launched the attack on the monetary system that plagued debt-ridden
American farmers, was also concerned with the impact that Darwinian
thought was having on the social problems of the day. As Larson notes,
Bryan's speeches reflected his belief that Darwin's notions about the sur-
vival of the fittest encouraged the exploitation of labor, furnished a justi-
fication for selfish competition, and dampened the possibilities for swift
reform by stressing gradual evolutionary change (p. 47).
Although their motivating concerns were moral and social, Bryan
and his Fundamentalist contemporaries chose to attack Darwin's theo-
ries on their scientific merits. Over and over again, these self-appointed
twentieth-century prophets attempted to impugn the accuracy of Dar-
win's scientific findings, ridiculing them as unsupported speculations. It
mattered little that by the 1920s Darwin's theories were widely accepted
in the scientific community. After all, it was popular opinion and not
temporary Fundamentalist movement was preceded by the debilitating and demoralizing war in
Vietnam, a public perception that the social engineering of the Great Society was a failure, and a
general sense of malaise about the moral health of society. While the parallels may be somewhat
superficial, the resemblance between the present underlying social forces and those that fueled an
earlier Fundamentalist drive in our history is enough to give one pause.
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scientific thought that counted in the political arena in which Bryan and
his followers were interested. Furthermore, since these early anti-evolu-
tionists set the terms of the initial debate, popular opinion, rather than
experimentally proven facts, was to govern public science as it was to be
taught in the public schools.
Trial and Error makes much of the relationship between popular
belief and the vicissitudes of the creationist movement. Larson's thesis is,
in essence, that in the final analysis popular opinion concerning the legiti-
macy of Darwin's theories is the single most important factor in deter-
mining the fate of the creationist movement. Indeed, although he does
not actually say as much, Larson suggests that the changing beliefs of a
majority of the population were indirectly responsible for the change in
the judicial climate that ultimately led to the movement's downfall.
While there is some truth to Larson's thesis, his ideas suffer from an
underestimation of the significance of the judiciary's increasing sensitiv-
ity to the values expressed in the first amendment.
III. THE SCOPES AFFAIR
The first legislation outlawing Darwin's teachings was enacted in
Oklahoma in 1923 (p. 49). The statute, which was passed in a rush of
emotionalism on the floor of that state's legislature, simply forbade all
mention of evolution in textbooks to be used in the public schools. Flor-
ida soon followed suit with a resolution of its own that prohibited the
teaching of evolution in the classroom (p. 53). Such early legislative ef-
forts set the stage for the 1925 enactment of the Tennessee anti-evolution
law that became the focus of the notorious Scopes trial. Governor Peay of
Tennessee anticipated the legal theory that would subsequently be used
to defend the law against constitutional attack when he decried the aban-
donment of the Bible as the source of the nation's contemporary
problems and then asserted that "Itihe people have the right and must
have the right to regulate what is taught in their schools" (p. 57).
According to Larson, the Scopes trial itself was as much a product
of local boosterism as it was a judicial test of the sincerely held beliefs
that characterized both sides of the argument (p. 58). The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) had advertised for a Tennessee teacher
who was willing to act as a guinea pig in testing the statute. In doing so,
the ACLU had captured the attention of several business and civic lead-
ers in Dayton, who immediately perceived the commercial benefits that a
highly publicized trial would bring. It was thus a small group of clever
entrepreneurs that first approached John T. Scopes (who had taught biol-
19871
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ogy only in a brief course geared toward final-exam review) and prevailed
upon him to stand as a defendant in a trial that would test the validity of
the law.
At that point in our legal history, it was almost inevitable that the
defenders of the anti-evolution statute would have the upper hand, de-
spite the formidable legal and scientific talent that had gathered in Day-
ton to challenge it.9 It was not until 1925, the same year as the Scopes
trial, that the freedom of expression guaranteed by the first amendment
was held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 10
Freedom of religious belief was not squarely incorporated in the liberties
promised by the fourteenth amendment until 1940.11 Thus, when the
prosecution in the Scopes case advanced the unqualified argument that
the state was entitled to direct the expenditure of its educational funds in
the manner it saw fit and to prohibit the teaching of evolution as an inci-
dent of that power, Scopes' defenders had little in their legal arsenal to
offer in opposition (pp. 67-72). Their principal argument-that the state
may not constitutionally infringe upon individual liberties by an irra-
tional exercise of its police powers-was tailored to lay the groundwork
for the introduction of expert testimony to demonstrate that the theory
of evolution was widely accepted in the reputable scientific community.
Such testimony, however, became irrelevant when the trial judge, John
T. Raulston, ruled that the state had the prerogative to outlaw evolution-
ary teaching regardless of the scientific merit of that doctrine (pp. 63-67).
With that ruling precluding the most fundamental of the defense's
arguments, Scopes' conviction by the jury was a foregone conclusion.
The outcome in the trial court was subsequently upheld on the merits by
the Tennessee Supreme Court on the narrow theory that whatever pri-
vate rights Scopes may have had, "he had no right or privilege to serve
9. Roger N. Baldwin, a founder of the American Civil Liberties Union and its then executive
director, was involved in the early stages of the preparation for the trial. When Bryan announced his
intention to contribute his services to the prosecution, the redoubtable Clarence Darrow and Dudley
Field Malone, both former Bryan supporters, volunteered to try the case for the defense. Bainbridge
Colby, Bryan's successor as United States Secretary of State, also participated in the pretrial defense
preparation, although he was succeeded by Arthur Garfield Hays for the actual trial. The future
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Charles Evans Hughes, agreed to represent Scopes in the United
States Supreme Court if the case ever reached that stage (pp. 61-63).
10. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
11. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Before Cantwell, it had been definitively held
that the federal Constitution made "no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in
their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws." Permoli v. New Orleans, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845).
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the State except on such terms as the State prescribed."12 In an ironic
twist, the Tennessee Supreme Court deprived Scopes' attorneys of the
United States Supreme Court hearing they had hoped for when it over-
turned the judgment of conviction on purely technical grounds. 13
Larson's own verdict on the Scopes affair is that it was a mixed vic-
tory, with each side gaining some, but not all, of the result it sought. The
advocates of the freedom to teach evolution in the public schools gained
the attention of the nation and the sympathy of the press, which repeat-
edly ridiculed the anti-evolution law under which Scopes was convicted
as an atavistic curio, a foolish product of ignorance, bigotry, and intoler-
ance. According to many other historians, the publicity that surrounded
the Scopes trial effectively arrested the spread of the anti-evolutionary
movement. Larson, however, stresses that the Tennessee Supreme
Court's decision, which precluded constitutional review by the United
States Supreme Court, left the way open for further state legislation and
further controversy on the subject.
In the two or three years that immediately followed the Scopes trial,
a frenzy of anti-evolutionary activity, especially in the South, resulted in
the passage of numerous statutes and executive proclamations outlawing
the teaching of Darwin's theories and the use of textbooks describing
those theories. Larson attributes some of the energy that accompanied
the renewed commitment to stamping out evolutionary teaching to the
martyrdom of William Jennings Bryan, who died within days after the
Scopes trial had ended (p. 75). Whatever the cause of this short-term
burst of activity, however, the fervor had been dissipated by 1928, and
for the next three decades an uneasy truce prevailed. Larson argues that
the anti-evolutionist forces gained ground during this period of relative
quiet because educators and textbook publishers simply minimized their
discussions of Darwin's theories in the hope of avoiding further contro-
versy (p. 84). The passage of time, however, ultimately caused the defeat
of the anti-evolutionist movement, as the intervening years brought im-
portant changes in both the governing legal principles and the public's
attitude toward science. These changes, in turn, dramatically altered the
very assumptions on which the Scopes decision and others like it were
based.
12. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 111, 289 S.W. 363, 364 (1927).
13. Id. at 120-21, 289 S.W. at 367. The error on which the judgment was reversed involved a
procedural flaw in the imposition of Scopes' sentence-a $100 fine. The defense had waived its right
to the proper procedure in the trial court and had not raised the issue on appeal. Like Scopes' trial
counsel, Larson infers from these circumstances that the procedural reversal was a subterfuge to
avert further review of the controversial issues raised by the trial (pp. 71-72).
1987)
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IV. THE CHANGING LEGAL CLIMATE
The free exercise clause of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution was first held applicable to the states in 1940.14 Some seven
years later, in Everson v. Board of Education,15 the United States
Supreme Court held for the first time that the states were also bound by
the establishment clause of that amendment. The latter decision was par-
ticularly significant because it interpreted the establishment clause to pre-
clude the states from aiding religion in general, rather than aiding or
favoring a particular denomination over the others. The Everson decision
thus transformed the establishment clause from a simple constitutional
prohibition against establishing a state religion, to one requiring a "wall
of separation" between all religion and government.16 In the process, the
Supreme Court also permanently transformed the terms on which the
battle between the pro- and anti-evolutionists would thereafter be fought.
Within a year after Everson was decided, the Supreme Court in-
voked the establishment clause to invalidate a school district's practice of
providing classroom space for on-site religious instruction. 7 In the same
vein, the Court later invoked the establishment clause to prohibit an offi-
cially sponsored public classroom prayer, despite claims that the prayer
itself was nondenominational and that its recitation was voluntary.' 8 At
approximately the same time, the Court held in School District of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp 19 that the reading of the Bible in public school
classrooms was inconsistent with the strictures of the establishment
clause. Taking note of the overlapping and sometimes conflicting require-
ments of the free exercise and establishment clauses, the Schempp Court
reiterated the importance of government maintaining a posture of strict
"neutrality" toward religion.20 Although it was acutely aware of the ar-
gument that banning all mention of religious concepts from the public
schools would make them bastions of a "religion of secularism" 2' and
might thereby impinge on the free exercise rights of believers, the Court
14. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
15. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a local practice of supplying public transportation for paro-
chial school students).
16. Id. at 15. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 440-42 (1961), the Supreme Court took
note of the historical arguments supporting the view that the establishment clause was designed only
to forbid the creation of a national church. It went on to note, however, that judicial gloss had given
the clause a far broader meaning.
17. Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
18. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
19. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
20. Id. at 222-23.
21. Id. at 225.
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gave that argument short shrift, stressing that the free exercise clause
"never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to
practice its beliefs."22 In language that was to have special significance
for the anti-evolutionist movement, the Court also held that to be consis-
tent with the establishment clause, state enactments tinged with religious
overtones must have "a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion."23
These cases laid the legal groundwork for the second phase of the
judicial debate over the place of Darwinian thought in the public school
classroom. The rationale of the Scopes court-that the state had unlim-
ited freedom to prescribe the science curriculum of the public schools-
was no longer viable in light of the ruling in Everson that the states' free-
dom of action was circumscribed by the establishment clause. Further-
more, the emphasis in Schempp on strict neutrality and the need for a
secular purpose made the continued existence of statutes banning the
teaching of evolution difficult to justify.
Coincident with these changing views about the proper constitu-
tional role of religious belief in the classroom was a gradually evolving
change in the public's attitude toward the intellectual discipline of sci-
ence. As Larson points out, the Cold War between the United States and
the Soviet Union that emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s brought
with it a renewed interest in science as a means of promoting the national
welfare. Soviet advances, such as the development of the technology nec-
essary to build an atomic bomb by 1949, and to launch a satellite into
space by 1957, caused American leaders concern and prompted them to
examine the state of technology in the United States. Fearing that the
Soviets, with their superior discipline and scientific training, would over-
take the United States in weapon technology and space exploration, the
federal government began pouring funds into scientific research and de-
velopment projects. The United States government turned its attention to
the science curriculum in the public schools, which many viewed as the
breeding ground for the nation's future strength.
These developments had two important consequences. First, the be-
lief of William Jennings Bryan and his followers, that the nation's well-
being depended upon the moral education of its young, was supplanted
by a belief that the national future rested on the quality of the secular
22. Id. at 226. To buttress its position, the Court also noted that the establishment clause might
not necessarily prohibit a study of the Bible or of religion that was presented objectively and as part
of a secular educational program. Id. at 225.
23. Id. at 222.
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scientific training made available in the public schools. Second, the en-
tirely distinct "religion" of science, with its unquestioning belief in the
primacy of objectively observable phenomena and purely logical deduc-
tive thought, gained widespread public acceptance and, in some senses,
replaced the traditional religions that were based on faith and belief in
what was, of necessity, not objectively verifiable.
V. THE EPPERSON DECISION
These developments culminated in Epperson v. Arkansas,24 the first
challenge to anti-evolution legislation to reach the United States Supreme
Court. The challenge was brought, with the encouragement of the ACLU
and a local National Education Association affiliate, by a young public
school biology teacher. She argued principally that the statute impaired
her first amendment right to freedom of expression and that the statute
was so vague as to violate due process of law (p. 109). The ACLU's
Supreme Court brief argued that the legislation violated the establish-
ment clause. The brief contended that the statute's sole purpose was to
aid those who believed literally in the Genesis account of creation, and
consequently, that the statute was invalid under the Schempp test (pp.
110-11). It was this view that the Court, in an opinion authored by Jus-
tice Abe Fortas, ultimately adopted.
In an uncharacteristic departure from the evenhanded stance he
takes throughout the rest of his book, Larson is curiously savage in his
criticism of the Fortas opinion in Epperson (pp. 115-19). He accuses Jus-
tice Fortas of accepting his law clerk's research uncritically and of basing
his own conclusion about the religious purpose of the statute on inade-
quate historical information. Larson even goes so far as to suggest that
Justice Fortas relied on a biased sample of the available historical mate-
rial and that he was intellectually dishonest in his use of some of the
material he cited. The documentation Larson provides for these rather
serious accusations, however, is slim and not particularly persuasive.
Larson takes Justice Fortas to task for not recognizing a study indi-
cating that the challenged Arkansas statute was not supported in dispro-
portionate numbers by the Fundamentalist segment of the electorate (p.
115). He also argues that Justice Fortas should have noted the fact that
the statute was enacted at a time when the leader of the anti-evolutionist
movement, William Jennings Bryan, was advocating such legislation be-
cause he felt that the teaching of Darwin's theories indirectly promoted
24. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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the kind of moral and social deterioration that leads to war, the exploita-
tion of labor, and other societal evils (p. 115).
Finally, Larson points to Justice Fortas's truncation of a quotation
from a contemporaneous newspaper advertisement championing the pro-
posed statute in his final draft of the Epperson opinion.25 Specifically,
Larson takes issue with the deletion of the following two sentences: "The
bill does not prohibit free speech, it does not seek to help the church. It
simply forbids the state attacking the church by having evolution taught
in the schools at taxpayers' expense" (p. 116).
Whatever Justice Fortas's motives were for deleting the quoted
sentences, however, it can hardly be said that the deleted matter provides
persuasive evidence for Larson's suggestion that the purposes underlying
the statute were secular. To the contrary, the deleted sentences are sim-
ply an inverted way of saying that the state may censor its curriculum to
protect the sensibilities of a particular religious viewpoint. Similarly, Lar-
son's assumption that Bryan's linkage of anti-evolution legislation to the
prevention of social evils furnishes a genuinely secular justification for
such legislation seems naive, since, as Larson himself acknowledges,
Bryan's oratory was merely a catalyst and a rallying point for those
whose opposition to evolutionary teaching was purely religious in nature
(p. 48). Finally, although Justice Fortas's opinion needs no defense, it
seems worthy of note that neither the state's attorney, who halfheartedly
argued that the challenged law should be upheld, nor the Arkansas high
court, which wrote a cryptic two-sentence per curiam opinion on the sub-
ject, advanced a particular secular purpose for the statute (pp. 111- 12).26
Moreover, Larson's contention that considerations other than
purely legal ones contributed to the Epperson majority's conclusion has
little to support it. It is true, as Larson notes, that the majority's lan-
guage illustrated its own belief that the anti-evolutionist credo was sim-
ply a quaint anachronism that was indefensible in light of modern
scientific knowledge.27 The use of modern sensibilities as a litmus test for
the constitutionality of longstanding laws and practices, however, was
certainly not a surprising or untoward departure from the decision-mak-
ing patterns of the Court that decided such landmark cases as Brown v.
25. The quotation, minus the deleted sentences, can be found in 393 U.S. at 108, n.16.
26. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 101 n.7, 109 n.18; see also id. at 109 (Black, J.,
concurring); id. at 114-15 (Harlan, J., concurring). As a judge having had occasion to consider cases
in a similar posture, I can find no fault with the conclusion that a statute has no constitutionally
permissible purpose when the state itself has offered none.
27. The Court, for example, referred to the statute derogatorily as a "monkey" law, 393 U.S. at
101, and "more of a curiosity than a vital fact of life in these States." Id. at 102.
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Board of Education2 and Reynolds v. Sims.2 9
Larson's other substantive basis for attacking the integrity of the
Epperson opinion is his own conclusion that the decision is inconsistent
with the Court's earlier application of the School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp test in McGowan v. Maryland,30 which involved an
establishment clause challenge to "blue laws" that require businesses to
close on Sunday, the Christian Sabbath. In Larson's view, the Court had
strained to find a secular purpose for the laws challenged in McGowan,
while in Epperson it had ignored available and plausible theories indica-
tive of a secular purpose for the challenged law. One of the theories that
Larson seems to endorse was expressed in Justice Hugo Black's concur-
ring opinion in Epperson, which posited as a secular justification the
state's interest in "withdraw[ing] from [the] curriculum any subject
deemed too emotional and controversial for its public schools."31 With
all due respect to the usually scholarly and meticulous Justice Black,
however, this proffered justification for the statute at issue in Epperson is,
to say the least, questionable. Both prior and subsequent Supreme Court
opinions make clear that the free speech clause of the first amendment
precludes school regulations impairing freedom of expression that are
premised solely on the fear that the suppressed ideas would be disturbing
or even provocative. 32 Thus, eliminating a particular topic from the
school curriculum on the ground that it is controversial hardly seems a
viable basis for justifying the Arkansas statute. Larson's effort to draw an
inference of disingenuous decision making from a comparison of the out-
comes in Epperson and McGowan is also unpersuasive. The secular pur-
pose the Court found in the latter case-the promotion of the public's
health and well-being through a state-enforced day of rest 3 3 -was both
instinctively obvious and historically supportable. In contrast, as Lar-
son's book most vividly demonstrates, all of the historical circumstances
surrounding anti-evolution statutes point to a religious purpose and no
other.
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
30. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
31. 393 U.S. at 113.
32. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-66 (1982); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943).
33. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 426-27.
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VI. THE PROBLEM OF STRICT NEUTRALITY
Larson's uncharacteristic lapse in rigor in his discussion of the Ep-
person decision suggests that he has a hidden agenda, or at least a per-
sonal bias that is not made explicit in his book. Perhaps the key to
Larson's underlying concern lies in his repeated emphasis on the legal
theory, advanced in some of William Jennings Bryan's writings, that leg-
islation prohibiting the teaching of evolution is necessary to maintain the
state's neutrality toward religion. The strict neutrality argument was
articulated most directly in Justice Black's concurring opinion in
Epperson:
A ... question that arises for me is whether .. forbidding a State to
exclude the subject of evolution from its schools infringes the religious free-
dom of those who consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine. If the the-
ory is considered anti-religious ...how can the State be bound by the
Federal Constitution to permit its teachers to advocate such an "anti-reli-
gious" doctrine to schoolchildren? ...The Darwinian theory is said to
challenge the Bible's story of creation; so too have those who believe in the
Bible, along with many others, challenged the Darwinian theory. Since
there is no indication that the literal Biblical doctrine of the origin of man is
included in the curriculum of Arkansas schools, does not the removal of the
subject of evolution leave the State in a neutral position toward these sup-
posedly competing religious and anti-religious doctrines? Unless this Court
is prepared simply to write off as pure nonsense the views of those who
consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine, then this issue presents
problems under the Establishment Clause far more troublesome than are
discussed in the [majority] opinion.3 4
I agree with Justice Black that the question of the State's obligation
to be neutral toward religion is a troubling one in this context, and I am
sorry that Mr. Larson, an attorney by trade, did not go further in explor-
ing it. There is ample language in the controlling Supreme Court opin-
ions indicating that the state can neither promote nor discourage
religion.3" In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, for exam-
ple, the Court stated: "[T]he State may not establish a 'religion of secu-
larism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to
religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who
do believe.' 36 While such homily is easy enough to recite, it is extremely
difficult to apply in the host of situations that place the two principles
34. 393 U.S. at 113.
35. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1962); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
18 (1947).
36. 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
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squarely in conflict and require analysis more sensitive than that sug-
gested by the Epperson majority's opinion.37 The controversy over teach-
ing Darwinian theory in the public schools is but one example. 38
Unfortunately, the problem admits of no easy answer. To the extent that
scientific ideas such as the theory of evolution are taught as truths, the
state may indeed be said to lend its stamp of approval to an anti-religious
or irreligious viewpoint, since the scientific and the literal biblical ver-
sions of the origin of the species are mutually exclusive theories in the
minds of many Fundamentalists. For those Fundamentalists whose reli-
gious creed includes undeviating acceptance of the latter version, the
teaching of Darwin in the public school classroom may be as offensive as
is the recitation of a brief classroom prayer to those who do not accept
the notion of a supreme being. Even where scientific ideas are taught as
mere hypotheses, 9 the omission from the curriculum of the biblical
37. The problem presented in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), is an example of the
difficulty of applying the doctrine of strict neutrality to specific disputes in a society like ours, which
is characterized by extensive governmental involvement in the everyday lives of citizens. The plain-
tiff in Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits because she refused to accept employment requir-
ing her presence on Saturday, which was her religious Sabbath. The Supreme Court held that the
denial of such benefits impermissibly infringed the plaintiff's rights under the free exercise clause of
the first amendment. Id. at 410. While this holding seems to be a fairly straightforward application
of modem first amendment principles, an argument could be made that the net effect of the Sherbert
decision is to favor religion by giving claimants who refuse employment for religious reasons an
advantage over those who do so for purely secular reasons. In any event, the Sherbert problem
highlights the fact that there is often no truly neutral ground lying between favoring religion and
treating it with hostility. Consequently, there are situations in which a choice of one or the other
must be made. For a thought-provoking discussion of the values to be employed in making such a
choice, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 813, § 14-7, at 833, § 14-10, at
846 (1978).
38. I had occasion to wrestle with the problem in an analogous context in In re Panarella v.
Birenbaum, 60 Misc. 2d 95, 302 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1969), rev'd, 37 A.D.2d
987, 327 N.Y.S.2d 775 (2d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 296 N.E.2d 238, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333
(1973). In that case, a City College student newspaper, funded by mandatory fees and sponsored by
the tax-supported institution, had published several articles violently attacking the Catholic Church
and Christianity in terms that can only be characterized as obscene. The petition of several students
seeking to enjoin the future publication of such articles required a careful balancing of the establish-
ment clause's prohibition against governmental hostility to religion against the right of free expres-
sion guaranteed by the first amendment. Although I concluded that the latter right did not furnish a
justification for the use of a government-sponsored newspaper as a vehicle for attacking a particular
religion, 60 Misc. 2d at 98, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 431, the Court of Appeals ultimately struck a different
balance by concluding that the state's provision of a neutral forum for expression did not, without
more, violate the establishment clause, 32 N.Y.2d at 116-17, 296 N.E.2d at 241-42, 343 N.Y.S.2d at
338-39. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (having created a forum generally open to
student groups, a state university cannot enforce a content-based exclusion based on religious
speech). The differing analyses in the various opinions in the Panarella case highlight the difficulty of
reconciling the competing rights and concerns that the first amendment implicates.
39. The significance of the distinction between teaching an idea as established "truth" and
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view-an omission that may well be compelled by the Constitution -
leaves room for the argument that the state's presentation of the subject
of mankind's origins is unbalanced unfairly in favor of the irreligious
position.
The problem is by no means an academic one. The past decade has
seen a resurgence of Fundamentalism and a renewed politicization of the
Fundamentalist movement. Our current President, Ronald Reagan, has
endorsed a balanced approach of teaching both Darwinian evolution and
the biblical version of creation in the schools (pp. 126-27), and the advo-
cates of the latter version have begun to compete with the traditional
scientific establishment for intellectual legitimacy by developing their
own theory of "scientific creationism" (pp. 123, 128-29). In the late
1970s and early 1980s, these factors coalesced to produce a spate of
equal-time legislation designed to place scientific creationism on an equal
footing with Darwinian teachings (pp. 125-67). Although most of this
legislation was struck down as unconstitutional,41 there can be little
doubt that the legal debate over evolution in the public schools will con-
tinue as long as a substantial and vocal segment of the population persists
teaching it as a mere hypothesis was a subject of discussion in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968). The state court in that case had specifically declined to express an opinion on the question
whether the challenged statute " 'prohibits any explanation of the theory of evolution or merely
prohibits teaching that the theory is true.'" Id. at 101 n.7. While the majority found both the dis-
tinction and the state court's refusal to reach the question irrelevant to its own conclusion, see id. at
102-03, the importance of the distinction was not lost on creationists, who launched a post-Epperson
drive for legislation requiring that evolution be taught as only one of a number of theories explaining
mankind's origins (pp.131-56).
40. In light of School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (no state
law or school board may require that Bible passages or the Lord's Prayer be recited in the public
schools even if students may be excused upon written request of their parents) and Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state officials may not compose an official state prayer and require its recital in
the public schools even if the prayer is denominationally neutral and pupils are allowed to remain
silent or be excused during its recital) it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the biblical version
of creation could be taught even as one of several theories explaining mankind's roots. Although
Schempp struck down only the use of the Bible for devotional exercises and expressly left room for
exposing students to the Bible as part of a secular course in literature or comparative religion, a
biology curriculum which presented Genesis as a possible alternative explanation to that offered by
Darwin would likely run afoul of the first amendment. Such a curriculum not only could be deemed
a violation of the "wall of separation" but also could leave the state open to the charge that it was
favoring adherents to the Bible over adherents to other religious credos.
41. See, eg., Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 462
F. Supp. 725 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Steele v. Waters, 527 S.W.2d 72
(Tenn. 1975); Willoughby v. Stever, Civil Action No. 1574-72 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1972), aff'd, 504
F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist.,
366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom.
Brown v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
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in the view that biblical creation and Darwinian theory are
irreconcilable.
It would be inappropriate, and probably counterproductive, for me
to attempt to resolve here the thorny legal problems that Larson's work
suggests. As an appellate judge with over eighteen years of experience in
resolving similar controversies, I am acutely aware of the wisdom of de-
ciding issues only within the framework of a particular factual setting,
and only after the concerned parties have fully briefed and argued their
competing positions, in the best traditions of our adversary system. For
now, it seems sufficient to bear in mind the observation of an ACLU
attorney that "the problem of creationism will persist because it is a legal
problem only in part" (p. 171). Like the many other contemporary issues
involving the relationship between governmental decisions and people's
most passionately felt religious convictions, the notion of a permanent
and fair judicial solution is simply unrealistic. The real key to resolving
such issues lies not in the inherently coercive powers of the courts and
legislatures, but rather in the voluntary acts of tolerance and accommo-
dation that make the idea of a truly democratic society viable.
VII. CONCLUSION
Edward Larson has written a fact-filled and thought-provoking
book, but in the end I found myself frustrated by its lack of analytical
substance. Trial and Error provides the reader with a mountain of infor-
mation about legislative debates, the positions of various factions, and
the intimate decision-making processes of the combatants. What is sorely
lacking, however, is a discussion of the larger social forces that have con-
tributed to the creationist movement's longevity and perseverance
throughout this century of rapid change.
When I first sat down to read Larson's book, I had a number of
questions and concerns in mind. What is it in our American culture, for
example, that drives so many to look to the legislatures, the courts, and
even the public schools as the principal guardians of moral and spiritual
values? This impulse, which is as strong today as it was in 1925, seems
strange in a nation that was founded in part on the belief that neither the
irreligious nor the devout are well served by a government that is entan-
gled in matters spiritual.42 The persistence of the highly politicized Fun-
damentalist movement in this country suggests to me a chasm between
42. See, eg., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259-60 & n.25
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 36
1987] ONLY FOOLS AND DEAD PEOPLE 209
the lofty values expressed in the Constitution and the actual sentiments
of a substantial segment of the citizens governed by that document. If
there is any truth to suggestion, it does not bode well for our democracy.
In his attempt to be evenhanded and balanced in his presentation of
the creationist movement's history, it is unfortunate that Larson has sim-
ply sidestepped this central issue. As a consequence, his book sheds little
light on one of our most important contemporary dilemmas-the need to
reconcile the political demands of the devout with the rights of the re-
mainder of the populace in a manner that is consistent with the mainte-
nance of a democratic society. Thus, while his book may be of academic
interest to some, it ultimately fails as a work of serious history since the
paramount value of studying the past lies in its ability to lend perspective
to the problems of the present, and to provide clues to their resolution.
I
